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When international relations theorists use the concept of risk aversion, they usually cite the
economics conception involving concave utility functions.  However, concavity is meaningful
only when the goal is measurable on an interval scale.  International decisions are usually not of
this type, so that many statements appearing in the literature are formally meaningless.
Applications of prospect theory face this difficulty especially, as risk aversion and acceptance
are at their center.  This paper gives two definitions of risk attitude that do not require an
interval scale.  The second and more distinctive one uses the property of submodularity in
place of concavity.  R. D. Luce has devised a theory of choice with features of prospect theory
but not requiring on an interval scale, and the second definition in combination with this theory
yields the traditional claim that decision makers are risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for
losses.
Keywords: risk aversion, prospect theory, international relations, joint receipts, measurement
theory.
JEL classification number: D811     Introduction
Theories about risk aversion and acceptance have appeared often in international relations
research, probably because they touch the most crucial issues -- an action that is too daring can
start a war.  The idea of an attitude to risk is attractive because it reconciles two opposing
notions: it allows leaders to have different personal decision-making styles and still act as
calculating goal-seekers.  Khrushchev was risk-acceptant but Brezhnev was risk-averse, and
one can say this without implying that one was less than rational than the other.  Risk attitudes
have received considerable attention in formal utility theory and prospect theory approaches.
1
This paper argues that most of these applications have a serious conceptual problem.
When we label someone risk-averse or acceptant, our superficial grammar suggests that it is a
trait inherent in the person.  Some reflection makes it clear, however, that we are invoking
another element: a baseline of neutral decision making.  We are suggesting that the person is
avoiding or accepting risk relative to some standard.  In everyday speech, saying someone is
"greedy" or "tall" is meant relative to the average, but international relations writers are not
claiming that a risk-averse leader avoids uncertainty more than a typical person.  They intend
their standard to be a theoretical one, for the sake of understanding leaders’ decision making in
an explanatory way, not a comparison with a population.  International applications either
leave the risk-neutral standard unclear, or use the economics standard in which risk neutrality
means indifference between playing a gamble and simply receiving its expected face value.
This rule is defined when the goal involves some measurable commodity like money.  However
in most international relations decisions, "expected face value" cannot be defined, since the
goal is not measurable with respect to an external amount or metric, separate from the
individual’s utility.  (More precisely, the goal is not an interval scale.  A loose term will
sometimes be used here, that it is not a "commodity.")  Assertions of risk aversion are then
meaningless, deductions drawn from them do not really follow, and the international
behaviours recruited to support one's theory are not relevant to its validity.
The first section describes why risk attitude is relative to an external standard and why
the standard economics definition requires an interval-scale measure of the goal.  It goes on to
indicate why most current ways of avoiding the problem are not successful.  The second
section, as a step to a definition, distinguishes absolute conceptions of risk attitude from
                                                        
1 Examples of the many non-formal uses of risk-aversion are Russett (1980) on Roosevelt, Huth and Russett
(1984) on Hitler and Chamberlain, and Kupchan (1988) on Soviet behaviour.  Some utility theory applications
of risk aversion are Alsharabati and Kugler (1997), Bueno de Mesquita (1980, 1981, 1985), Fearon (1995),
Huth, Gelpi and Bennett (1993), Huth, Bennett and Gelpi (1992), Kilgour and Zagare (1991), Kugler (1987),
Kugler and Zagare (1987), Morrow (1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1994, 1996), Niou and Ordeshook (1990), Powell
(1995), Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley (1983), Snidal (1993) and Wagner (1985, 1991).  Some prospect theory
applications or discussions are Bauer and Rotte (1997), Berejikian (1997), Boettcher (1995, 1997), Davis
(1997), Davis and Arquilla (1991), Farnham (1992, 1994, 1997), Gause and Feldman (1998), Jervis (1988,
1989, 1992), Kanwisher (1989), Kowert and Hermann (1997), Lebow and Stein (1989), Levy (1987, 1989,
1992a,b, 1996, 1997a,b, 1998), McDermott (1994, 1998), McInerney (1992), Mintz and Geva (1998),
Richardson (1992), Stein (1992), Stein and Welch (1997), Taliaferro (1997a,b), Weber (1991), and Weyland
(1996).relative ones.  An absolute conception asserts simply that someone is risk-averse or risk-
acceptant as if there were a zeropoint of neutrality, while a relative conception labels one
person as more risk-averse than another without implying a zeropoint.  The simplest
economics conception is an absolute one, and the section gives a corresponding relative
definition.  Using a relative definition avoids the need for a risk-neutral standard and fits with
much previous international relations theories, but it requires that their claims be reformulated.
The next section defines risk aversion in an absolute sense.  Different from the
economics use of concavity, it uses the idea of submodularity.  The decision maker’s goal is
assumed to involve several kinds of benefits received jointly, and I describe a theory of choice
for such situations, which shares many features of prospect theory but not the need for a
money-like commondity.  It as developed by Luce and his co-workers with the goal of
accounting for experimental data on joint benefits, not to avoid interval scales or represent risk
aversion, but the relation is straightforward under the revised definition.  The next section
describes a usual metaphor that depicts risk as an external substance that can be "shared,"
"transferred," or "avoided."  This can have misleading implications, and the section shows that
the revised definitions avoid them and clarify the nature of risk.
The most common goal for introducing risk attitude into international relations theory
has been to understand decision making in general, rather than to answer a particular policy
problem.  Applications of prospect theory have helped us understand international decision
making by introducing psychological research.  It is important however to recognize the
distinctive aspects of international decisions, and modify the approach accordingly.
2     The Need for an Interval Scale
A theory that calls leaders risk-averse or acceptant should state its standard of neutrality, and
both prospect theory and utility theory applications use the microeconomic one, of making
decisions entirely by expected value.  Utility theory’s version, suggested by di Finetti (1952)
and developed by Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1964), is simpler than prospect theory’s and will be
reviewed briefly.  A risk-neutral person is one who is indifferent between playing a gamble
and receiving its expected value in cash.  For example, the person will be indifferent between
receiving $100 for sure or playing a 50/50 gamble for $0 or $200.  (Since it is assumed that
more money is better, the risk-neutral person would choose the gamble over any sure payment
less than $100, and the reverse for a payment that is higher.)  Someone who chooses the
gamble over its expected value is risk-acceptant or risk-seeking, and someone choosing the
expected value is risk-averse.  The general trait is the person’s risk attitude.  The definition
uses a criterion involving the gamble’s face value, and this is a crucial.  If it had said that a risk-
neutral person is indifferent between a gamble and a sure thing without qualification, it would
be empty since anyone can be induced to choose one or the other by making it sufficiently
attractive.  This version of the definition is stated in terms of money, but any goal will do --
bushels of wheat produced, literacy rate, etc- -- as long as one can calculate a expected value.The next step in the utility approach is to connect risk aversion with the shape of the
decision maker’s utility function for the commodity: a decision maker who is risk-averse must
have a utility for it that is concave.  (A concave function bulges upwards between any two
points; or more exactly, for any two points on it, the straight line segment connecting them lies
below the function.
2)  In the context of a desirable good like money, concavity means that
utility is increasing, but increasing at a decreasing rate.  Figure 1 shows why a concave
function means choosing $100 for certain over the gamble: u($100) lies on the vertical axis
above the gamble’s utility, which is the 50/50 weighted average of u($200) and u($0).  The
sure thing is preferred because of the upward bulge between the loss and win utilities.  If the
utility function were convex and sagged there, it would represent a risk-seeker who would
choose the gamble.
3, 4
These definitions of risk aversion and acceptance put constraints on the measurement
scales that can appear on the x-axis, and it is worthwhile to go through some fundamentals to
see why.  A measurement scale is an assignment of numbers to a set of empirical events such
that
certain arithmetical relations among the numbers mirror some significant empirical relations
among the corresponding events.  In a typical scale, only some of the numerical relations mean
                                                        
2 A consequence of the definition that will be useful is that convexity and concavity can still apply if a function
is defined at only a finite number of points.
3 It is possible to be risk-averse at one level of assets and risk-seeking at another.  Also, with a "wavy" utility
function, it is possible to be risk-averse for small gambles and the risk-seeking for large ones, or the reverse.
To avoid this one could specify that the property is a "local" one, applying to small gambles.
4 The next step in the economic theory is to define degree of risk aversion, the most accepted definition being
Arrow and Pratt’s: r(x) = -u"(x)/u’(x), and a further element is to define the riskiness of a gamble (Rothschild
and Stiglitz, 1970).  The set of these concepts should be defined coherently in the sense that the riskiness of a
gamble should be what risk-averse people are averse to.  The usual definitions are coherent, but alternative
systems are possible (e.g., Landsberger and Meilijson, 1990).anything in the world; the rest have no interpretation.  In the context of calendar years, for
example, it is empirically significant that the number 1936 is greater than 1919 -- the numerical
order of these numbers indicates the temporal order of the corresponding years.  However, the
fact that 1936 is a perfect square and 1919 is not, or that the ratio 1936/1919 has a certain
value, is empirically meaningless with no external significance.
5
Measurement scales are classified by their "strength."  The stronger the scale, the more
of its numerical relationships possess empirical interpretations.  In an interval scale, an
empirical meaning is attached to comparisons of one interval (the numerical difference between
a pair of scale values) with another, in terms of being smaller, equal or greater.  The scale
involving amounts of money qualifies as an interval scale (in fact, it is stronger, a ratio scale
6),
since the numerical equality of the difference between $2 and $3 and that between $5 and $6
has an empirical interpretation.  It is so simple that it is easy to overlook: adding a dollar bill to
$2 will bring the amount to $3, and the same operation will bring $5 up to $6.  The additional
dollar functions like a ruler in space that marks off equal distances in "money space."  IQ
scores are an example of a scale that is not interval, as it is unclear how to interpret interval
comparisons.  In what sense is a jump from 130 to 140 points equivalent to one from 60 to 70?
IQ might be claimed to be an ordinal scale, if those who do better on the test really have
greater analytical abilities in life, but it does not qualify as interval.
Returning to the definitions of risk attitudes, concavity means that utility increments are
shrinking for equal increases in the desired commodity.  This phrase involves comparison of
intervals, so to support assertions about risk aversion, the x-axis must be at least an interval
scale.  The typical international decision -- over intervening in a conflict, forming an alliance,
or signing a treaty -- has a goal that is not measurable on a interval scale.  The problem is not
that the objective is non-monetary, since risk attitudes can be and have been used for goals like
the percent of work force unemployed, the number of lives lost in an epidemic (Quatronne and
Tversky, 1988), or deaths in election violence (Kowert and Hermann, 1997).  These scales are
interval -- an increase from 4% to 7% in unemployment is the same as from 10% to 13%, in
the sense that the same number of additional people are out of work.  The problem is that an
international decision is usually over a bundle of objectives, some with interval scales and some
                                                        
5 “Meaningless” is used here in the well-defined sense of formal measurement theory (Coombs, Dawes and
Tversky, 1978; Roberts, 1984; Narens, 1985.)
6 In a ratio scale, the ratio of a pair of values has an empirical interpretation.without, but it does not have a single goal where one can mark off equal increments or
otherwise compare intervals.
Multiple Interval Scales
The problem arises when there is no interval scale, but it is broader than that.  A decision can
often be described in different ways involving alternative interval scales, with the decision
maker showing risk aversion in one formulation and risk acceptance in another.  Suppose a
person has $10,000 to invest in one of two ways.  An investment will gain value for ten years
at a certain annual rate i, then it is withdrawn and spent on a vacation.  For one opportunity,
the investor knows i, but for the other i is uncertain in the investor’s mind.  For the latter, it
will be assumed that i is learned right after the investment is made and remains fixed over the
ten-year period.  It is also assumed that the individual’s utility for the interest rate is u(i) = i
3/2.
This function  is convex, so the individual is risk-acceptant with respect to the interest rate.
However, the problem can also be viewed as uncertainty over the money earned.  There is
clearly a one-to-one relationship between interest rate and final amount: rate i produces wealth
w of $10,000 (1 + i)
10.  Since utilities are determined by outcomes, assuming a utility function
for the interest rate commits one to a utility function for wealth, and straightforward
calculation gives it as u
*(w) = (w
1/10 - 1)
3/2.  This function is concave -- now the person is risk-
averse.  These are not two different decisions, but two different descriptions of the same
decision.  Since the framing is arbitrary, so is the risk attitude.
A counterargument might be raised that only the second formulation in final wealth is
appropriate, that money is what the individual is "really" after.
7  But this is insupportable --
money has no innate value; it is usually acquired to spend.  This individual wants to use it for a
vacation, and we might assume that the number of vacation days is a non-linear function of the
money, such that the individual has a risk-acceptant utility function for days.  Money would
then be clearly an intermediate step, again the new description would imply the opposite risk
attitude.  Money is the metric favoured by economics because it can be transferred back and
forth and is conserved in such interactions.  This property is important for economics because
that discipline studies social interaction for goods, but it is not about the individual's
personality as reflected in decision making.  The example shows that even given the context
and the decision, risk attitude in the sense of concave utility functions is not a personality trait,
                                                        
7  In the finance literature risk attitude is often applied to interest rates, and some experiments on prospect
theory involve the inflation rate, which is equivalent (Quattrone and Tversky, 1988).but a relationship between the decision maker’s choice pattern and the measurement scale of
the goal.  The scale is crucial.
Prospect Theory Applications
In utility theory, the decision maker attaches a value to each possible outcome, but prospect
theory looks at the difference between the outcome and some mental reference point.  The
reference point depends on how the decision is set up in the individual’s mind, that is, on how it
is "framed."  A "value," which is the prospect theory analogue for a utility, is attached to each
degree of change from the reference point.  The approach was developed by Kahnemann and
Tversky (1979; an updating is Kahnemann and Tversky, 1992).  Further postulates are that the
loss side of the reference point is steeper than the gain side, termed loss aversion, and that
sensitivity to losses or gains is marginally decreasing with the amount lost or gained.
8  The
implication is that the value function is S-shaped -- the decision maker is risk-averse for gains
and risk-seeking for losses.  It is also assumed that if the problem admits objective
probabilities, the decision maker does not use these directly as weights for the values, but
transforms them according to a certain function.
9  Various auxiliary hypotheses are added for
particular contexts, such as assumptions about how people edit the input to set up their
decision or how they change their reference point over experience and time.
Prospect theory is often presented as the psychological alternative to rational choice, so
it is ironical that it comes with relatively more economics baggage about the shapes of
functions over interval scales.  Accordingly, the lack of an interval-scale goal has greater
impact on prospect theory.  Also, prospect theory applications have been more empirically-
based than utility theory’s, and the closer that researchers have gotten to historical cases, the
more they have met difficulties that stem from the scale problem.  Some case studies that went
to great detail on leaders’ decisions have been strongly criticized on conceptual grounds.
Several authors have expressed second thoughts about prospect theory (e.g., Boettcher, 1995;
Jervis, 1992; Levy, 1992b, 1997a; Shafir, 1992; Stein, 1992.)  In my view, their doubts are
connected with the scale problem, although they have not identified them as such.  They often
                                                        
8 Many of the criticisms raised here also apply to loss aversion.  It would be worthwhile to work out alternative
definitions there too, but this paper will be confined to risk attitudes.
9 Another sense of risk aversion occasionally used in prospect theory applications is based on the probability
weighting function.  Someone who understates the probability of a loss will take excessive chances and thus be
risk-seeking.  This sense is less often used because "aversion" seems to imply a deliberate avoidance, not a
cognitive mistake of misunderstood probabilities.attribute prospect theory’s difficulty to the impossibility of getting accurate measurements of
leaders’ constructions of the situation and their utilities.  Levy, for example, has been a major
proponent of the approach in international relations, but has expressed reservations on several
grounds.  His main concern is that laboratory experiments supporting prospect theory gave
their subjects simpler, more structured and measurable decisions than national leaders face.
Subjects are offered two-way choices with values and likelihoods of success.  Levy notes the
absence of interval scales in the international setting, but sees it as a lack of laboratory control
(1997a, 99).  However, the arguments here indicate that the issue is not the practical one of
measuring risk attitudes, but the conceptual one of defining them.
Boettcher also sees prospect theory’s problem as its data requirements, the difficulty of
specifying the utilities and probabilities of foreign policy decision makers.  His proposed
solution for the probability aspect is to collect data on the relation of frame to the decision
maker’s nonnumerical probability expressions, such as "possible" and "likely."  However, he
were able to measure probabilities and utilities precisely, assertions about risk attitude would
still be meaningless in these contexts, without an interval scale on the objective.
3     Responses to the Lack of an Interval Scale
The scale difficulty has generally not been named in the literature but it has been present, and
international relations writers have used a variety of methods to attribute risk attitudes to states
and leaders nonetheless.  This section puts their approaches into six categories and describes
the difficulties.  The purpose is to show that only a few work, and that these work only in
restricted contexts, and so to motivate the interval-scale-free definition.
The first common pattern is to describe an historical case where a leader had two
possible courses, one of which had a predictable outcome, and the other an uncertain one.  The
argument interprets making the sure or risky choices as a sign of risk aversion or acceptance,
respectively.  Examples of risk-acceptant choices were Britain and France intervening in Suez
(Richardson, 1992), and Eisenhower lying about U-2 overflights (McDermott, 1997).  A
cautious decision was Eisenhower staying out of Suez (McDermott, 1997).  Any attribution of
risk aversion should imply a standard, and here it is the rejected course of action -- a decision
maker who chose the other road would be showing the opposite risk attitude.
The logic appears solid: opting for the uncertainty seems like an obvious sign of risk
acceptance.  The problem is that utility theory and prospect theory do not support this
conclusion -- their usages of the words "aversion" and "acceptance" are misleading.  AsBoettcher has pointed out, within these theories any decision maker, risk-averse or acceptant,
will choose the course with the higher expected utility (or in prospect theory, the higher
weighted value).  This may be the uncertain one, so the choice does not show risk acceptance.
The misunderstanding is exploited by a simple examination question that reliably trips up
students.  A risk-averse person has two options, a sure outcome with utility 100, or a 50/50
gamble with expected utility 100.  Which will be chosen?  Students want to say that a risk
averter will prefer the sure thing, but since the domain is utilities rather than payoffs, the
correct answer is indifference.  A safe choice can be used to identify someone’s risk attitude
only when the alternatives can be compared by their expected face values.
One manifestation of this misunderstanding in the prospect theory literature has been
the continual the failure of a decision implies risk-acceptance.  The bulk of the actions cited as
risky have been ones that were later regretted.  One might find an analysis of Kennedy’s
invasion in the Bay of Pigs, but not his blockade of Cuba during the missile crisis.  If
attributing a risk attitude requires a standard, here it is hindsight.  By definition risky actions
often fail, but the literature’s uniformity of bad outcomes suggests that there has been a
selection bias in that direction.  They sometimes succeed, but then the analyst seems ready to
interpret the leader as willing to act on a chance worth taking.  This is a plausible explanation,
but it might be just as true that the failed decisions were sensible given what the actor knew at
the time.  Taking failure is an indicator of rashness and risk acceptance works as a substitute
for calculating expected face values, but it is not a valid one.
The idea that choosing a risky course implies risk acceptance appears in Bueno de
Mesquita’s revised expected utility theory of war (1985) and its development by Morrow
(1987).  A state can choose different policy positions, and to each is associated a danger of
attack.  A policy's "insecurity measure” is defined as the sum of the expected utilities that the
other states would derive from starting a war against the state given its policy choice.  The
state’s risk aversion is the closeness of its insecurity measure to the minimum value,
normalized by the distance between the minimum and maximum.  However, a state’s policy
choice may lie near the minimum simply because of good luck in the configuration of political
forces, i.e., because it is the desirable course on various grounds.  One cannot attribute the
choice to risk attitude, and if the measure correlates with other variables, as this literature has
indicated, the finding will not be properly interpreted and understood.
A second common approach is suggesting that there is an appropriate interval scale,
compared to which the decision maker is being risk-averse or acceptant, but not elaboratingon how to measure the scale.  As an example of the international implications of prospect
theory, Levy (1992a, 93) states that after suffering losses in territory, reputation or domestic
support, leaders tend to take "excessive risks" to recover them.  He adds that “‘excessive’ is
defined with respect to predictions based on expected value."  This implies that there is a
objectively right way to combine the goals on the list into an expected value, separate from
leaders’ utilities, but how to do it is not specified.  Even if one could objectively rank order the
outcomes according to their promotion of the "national interest," that would not be enough,
since attributing risk attitude requires an interval scale.  Further, if more than one interval scale
were possible, one would have to specify which one is being taken as the standard, since, as
the investing-for-a-vacation example showed, risk attitudes depend on which scale is meant.
A related approach is to suggest that there are correct utilities for a decision, compared
to which the person is being too safe or risky.  Jervis (1992) presents a prospect theory
interpretation of crisis instability, and suggests that a leader will tend to order a pre-emptive
strike "[i]n cases in which the standard expected utility model would predict the actor to cut
his losses."  However, there is no standard theory for the leader's utilities.  Many strategic
analyses of war have appeared, but they do not give such calculations; they estimate weapons
destroyed or lives lost, but these quantities are only part of a nation's considerations in
choosing peace or war.  Utilities reflect what the decision maker does; they do not give a
proper risk-neutral way to behave on the brink of war.
To introduce risk aversion, Fearon (1995, 386) assumes that states fight over territory.
This is unobjectionable on methodology grounds, since territory is a variable with a ratio scale,
even stronger than an interval scale.  However, it raises the question of how to interpret the
model's conclusions about risk aversion and war in the general international situation, when no
such scale is available.A third approach to importing the economics definition involves spacing the possible
outcomes at equal intervals on the x-axis.  An example is Bueno de Mesquita’s original
expected utility theory of war (Figure 2), where a national leader can choose the status quo of
peace, or go to war, possibly to win or lose.
10  If this equal spacing produces a concave utility
function, then he terms the leader risk-averse.  (The utility function is defined at only three
points, but if the middle value lies above the line joining the other two, it can be properly called
concave, as stated in footnote 2.)  Morrow (1994) presents a modification that labels the
middle outcome the "median," suggesting that in a decision with more than three possible
outcomes, they should again be spaced equally.  In effect, the method constitutes a rule for
constructing an interval scale for a given decision.  The problem, however, is the arbitrariness
of the equal spacing.  There is no meaningful empirical sense of "distance" in which the
distance between losing a war and the status quo is equal to the distance between the status
quo and winning.  The arbitrariness can be shown by splitting one of the outcomes into
different versions.  In Figure 2, one could divide the outcome of losing the war into three:
"losing badly," "losing" and "losing indecisively."  This would alter the relative positions on the
x-axis of the original three outcomes and change the median outcome to "losing indecisively."
The latter has a lower utility than the current median, and if its utility is sufficiently low, the
risk attitude will change from averse to acceptant.  This consequence is unsatisfactory: a
party’s risk attitude should not depend on whether the analyst splits or groups certain
outcomes.
                                                        
10 Bueno de Mesquita’s graph puts peace on the left and has the curves going downwards -- the choice is purely
a convention.A fourth approach involves introducing an interval-scale variable over which the
leader has a preference, but one that is not the goal.  This category includes a variety of
models, and two will be discussed briefly.  In one by Morrow (1996), a state is rising in power
and will rival the dominant state.  The latter can compromise by making concessions, or resist
with the danger of war, and Morrow relates risk aversion to the likelihood of war.  The states
are deriving continuous benefits from a situation drawn out over time, and a special feature is
his way of calculating utilities in this context.  At a given time, a state enjoys a certain input of
benefit from its world position, and this instantaneous utility is integrated over time to get its
total utility.  If a state’s utility function is such that a constant situation yields increments in
benefits that are a decreasing concave function of the time over which the situation is
experienced, then the state is termed risk-averse.  Thus, what appears on the x-axis is duration,
a ratio scale and stronger than an interval scale.  A difficulty, however, is the model’s use of
integration, which conflicts with the concept of risk aversion.  Standard risk aversion means
that if two benefits are received simultaneously, their utility is less than the sum of the
individual utilities -- the utility of getting $1 twice (i.e., u($2)), is less than twice that of gaining
$1 (of 2u($1)).  If this subadditivity applies to two benefits coming in at the same time, it is
problematic to have the utility of getting $1 twice jump to the sum of the individual values
when one of the dollars is delayed momentarily.  However, this is what integrating over time
(the continuous version of adding over time) implies.
11
Another example of the fourth approach is Huth, Bennett and Gelpi’s model (1992) of
system uncertainty and war.  They see a state as risk-averse if it tends to avoid choices without
clear probability values in favour of those with specified probabilities.  Such states then are
showing preferences over probability distributions over probabilities -- they prefer the
distributions that have low variance.  The x-axis is probability, which is more than an interval
scale.  However this phenomenon is more often called ambiguity aversion, and is conceptually
different from risk aversion.  Someone might dislike choices with undefined probabilities but be
drawn to unpredictable gambles whose probabilities are clear, and thus be ambiguity-averse but
                                                        
11 The problem is clearer in problems involving finite time and summation, where total utility is taken as the
sum of utilities at each time:    
t u(xt), for t = 1, 2, . . .  The factor   is the time discount factor, and u is assumed
concave to represent risk aversion (e.g., Garfinkel, 1991).  Consider two options: (1) a 50% chance of getting
$10 daily for four days and a 50% chance of nothing for four days;  (2) for each of the four days independently,
a 50% chance of $10 and a 50% chance of $0.  A risk-averse person would choose the second, but the
summation formula gives them equal utilities.  Solutions have been discussed by Ayman, Hindy and Huang
(1992), Huang, Hindy and Kreps (1992), Pratt (1995), and others.risk-acceptant.  Indeed Kuchen (1997) lists several experimental studies that found no
correlation in their subjects between the degrees of risk and ambiguity aversion.
A fifth approach involves spatial models, where each leader has an ideal point over
some policy space and has a preference that decreases with the distance of the true situation
from the ideal.  Risk aversion is introduced by postulating that each country’s utility is a
concave function of this distance (e.g., Morrow, 1986).  These models do not specify an
interval-scale measure for the space or for distance, but it can be shown that their assumption
of single-peaked preferences in effect determines one almost exactly when sufficiently many
decision makers with different ideal points are included (Coombs, 1954).
In summary, spatial models and certain others cannot be criticized on meaningfulness
grounds, but they apply in a limited context.  Most ways of circumventing the scale problem
are unsuccessful.
4     Relative Risk Aversion: A Commodity-Free Definition
Several studies have used a sixth approach to attribute risk attitude, and this section shows that
it leads to a solid concept.  These involve contrasting a decision maker’s action with what
others did in a similar situation, and identifying a party making the more cautious or risky
choice as risk-averse or acceptant.  The standard of risk neutrality then becomes someone
else’s behaviour.  A definition can be provided that supports this argument, but it requires some
restatement of assumptions and conclusions, since it labels an actor as not risk-acceptant in the
absolute sense, but as relatively more risk-acceptant than some other party.
The revised definition goes as follows.  Suppose that A and B each face decisions.
Their choices may have different utilities and probabilities over the possible outcomes, but the
outcomes in one player’s set can be paired with those in the other’s.  A plot is constructedplacing each utility for A on the horizontal axis and B’s utility for the matched outcome
vertically (Figure 3).  If the resulting points lie on an increasing straight line, the individuals are
equal in risk attitude; if they form a one-to-one increasing concave function then B is more
risk-averse than A; a one-to-one increasing convex function means that B is more risk-
acceptant than A.  ("One-to-one" is defined with respect to the set of each player’s utility-
values for the outcomes.)  Any other result would mean that the risk attitudes are not
comparable.  The advantage of the definition is that it does not require an external interval-
scale goal; the other party’s utilities are put on the horizontal axis to play that role.  The
criterion of risk attitude is the same as before, concavity or convexity, but the difference with
the regular definition is shown by the possibility that for a decision over money, one party
might be more risk-averse than the other in the relative sense, but both are risk-seeking in the
usual sense.
12  If there are two outcomes for which one party is indifferent while the other has
a preference, the parties cannot be compared for risk.  To allow a one-to-one function, the set
of outcomes should be small, or if it is large or infinite, it should have an ordered structure like
amounts of money, that gives its different elements different desirabilities.
The definition requires that the outcomes be matched in a sensible way, "sensible"
meaning not arbitrary or idiosyncratic, but reasonably likely to allow a generalization to a
lawful regularity.  For McDermott’s case of the Suez Crisis, Britain’s utility for intervening
successfully could be associated with the United States’ utility for the same action, and so on.
There is no restriction that the matched pair of events be similar or even compatible.  If two
                                                        
12 The connection between this construction and the degree of risk aversion r(x), as defined in footnote 10, has
been noted by several authors (e.g., Ross, 1981; Roth and Rothblum, 1982). If B’s r(x) is higher than A’s for all
x, then this curve, which is the function uA uB
-1, will be concave.  This measure r(x) presumes an interval scale.states face a possible war against each other, victory could be matched with victory and defeat
with defeat.  The events in such a pair cannot both occur, but the arrangement might still be a
fruitful way to compare risk attitudes.
A concept’s definition should have more than face appeal -- its consequences should
also fit our intuitions.  The simplest implication of the definition is that if A is more risk-averse
than B, then B is more risk-seeking than A.  Another rule is that relative risk aversion is
transitive: if A is more risk-averse than B, and B more risk-averse than C, then A is more risk-
averse than C.  This is easy to prove from the definition of concavity.  A third appropriate
consequence is that the more risk-averse person behaves more conservatively, in a defined
sense.  Suppose that A and B each have the same choice between a specified sure outcome and
a specified gamble, and that A chooses the sure outcome.  Then if B is more risk-averse than A
according to the definition, B also chooses the sure outcome.  The corresponding statement
can be made for a B-chooser who is more risk-acceptant than A: when A chooses the gamble,
B also chooses the gamble.  A related result applies to two persons facing the same choice of a
two-outcome gamble or a sure outcome whose utility lies between the two utilities from the
gamble.  Each person will have a critical probability for the gamble, a minimum probability of
winning that would be required before choosing the gamble.  A relatively more risk-averse
person will have a higher critical probability.
13
A further test of adequacy is whether the concept is more or less constant over various
contexts in the world.  We do not have a special word for a winged giraffe because we do not
need one, and if this concept of risk attitude does not correspond to some regularity, then it
has no purpose.  A body of research suggests that it is stable in this way, in effect that it
represents a personality trait, given a sensible matching rule.  The work comes from
psychology and management science, and addresses the worry that more risk-acceptant people
tend to get involved in crime, automobile accidents, teenage pregnancy, drug abuse, or bad
business decisions.  Kagan and Wallach (1965) presented college students with imaginary
dilemmas facing a third party, and asked for the critical probability of success before they
would recommend that the person take a chance.  Karen could become a doctor and be sure of
monetary success, or go to music school in hopes that she can do what she really loves.  What
minimum probability of success in music should she require?  MacCrimmon and Wehrung
                                                        
13 For a two-outcome gamble, consider the ratio of gain over loss, where gain and loss are utility differences
with respect to the sure thing.  If the ratio is always greater for one person than the other, then the latter is more
risk-averse by the definition.(1986) presented business executives with fictitious memos from the boss, calling for a
recommendation in a problem situation.  The researchers also asked for reports of subjects’
actual risk behaviours: How much insurance do you have?  Have you ever left a job without
having a new one to step into?
14  Kowert and Hermann (1997) report further studies of this
kind.
These questions fit the present relative definition and not the standard one.  There is no
interval scale on the amount of happiness Karen experiences during a career in music.  The
question measures the relative risk aversion among the subjects by finding their different
responses to the same choice, separating them according to whether their critical probabilities
lie above or below that implied in the question.  These researchers report an association
between risk propensity and traits like openness, sensation-seeking, impulsiveness, age, and
position in a company.  Other authors, reviewed by MacCrimmon and Wehrung, have
concluded that regular patterns of risk propensity emerge if risky situations are clustered by
type.  People act differently for physical or emotional or monetary danger, but show a
regularity within each category.  Stable results like these suggest that risk aversion in the
relative sense is empirically important.
The relative notion of risk aversion seems to be what some international relations
authors had in mind.  McDermott contrasted British and French intervention in Suez with the
American decision to stay out, and suggested that the former states were risk-acceptant,
consistent with prospect theory's prediction.  However, more risk-acceptant is different from
absolutely risk-acceptant, and the conclusions have to be restated accordingly.  Sometimes the
comparison is within an individual, when an external event is seen as shifting the person's
mental reference point.  Farnham compared President Roosevelt’s behaviours at different
times: before a certain point he would not intervene in the Munich Crisis, then he switched his
position.  Berejekian (1997) applied this argument to the European Community move to
accepting the Montreal Protocol for the protection of the ozone layer, and McDermott used it
for President Carter, who came to allow the Shah of Iran to enter the United States.  However,
one can conclude only that these actors became relatively more risk-acceptant.
The relative concept of risk aversion is significant and applicable, then, and it is also
somewhat closer to the everyday usage of the word "risk" than the economics definition.  It fits
within a common approach in international relations theory, simplified models of a type of
decision, such as losing a war, winning, or staying at peace, on which different actors are
                                                        
14 The authors also gave subjects choices involving money gambles.compared.  It also fits the idea of several authors cited above of comparing decision-makers
with themselves at other times.  However, it supports a relative conclusion about risk-aversion,
not an absolute one.  It connects the empirical findings not to concave utility functions or to
prospect theory, but to psychological research on personality.
5     Absolute Risk Aversion: a Commodity-Free Definition
The second definition of risk aversion is quite different from the standard one.  The idea was
alluded to by di Finetti (1952) but fully stated by Richard (1975).  There has been very little
theoretical literature on it since (exceptions being Mosler, 1984, and Scarsini, 1985, 1988,
1991), and it has been applied in only a few contexts (e.g., Ingersoll, 1992).  Consider two
objects that you prefer to the status quo, for example, a sports car and a speedboat.  You must
choose between the following two gambles:
Receive both the car and boat (probability 1/2) or neither (probability 1/2),
or
Receive only the car (probability 1/2) or only the boat (probability 1/2)?
To make the choice, a first impulse might be to ponder whether the car or the boat is
more desirable to you.  However, whichever gamble you choose, you will receive the car with
probability ½ and the boat with probability ½.  Neither gamble gives you a better chance at
your favorite item, so your relative preference for the car or boat should not matter.  The issue
is whether you want to go for both or neither, as in the first gamble, or be sure of getting at
least one item, as in the second.  Someone who is indifferent is defined as risk-neutral,
someone who strictly prefers all or nothing is risk-acceptant, and someone who wants to be
sure of one or the other is risk-averse.  The standard of risk neutrality, then, involves making
decisions purely on the two likelihoods of getting each item, without attaching a special value
to getting at least one or getting both.
The definition is applicable when the individual's goal involves separate dimensions.  (In
the example, the dimensions are simply: car, no car and boat, no boat.)  An important
requirement is a prespecified ranking on certain combinations of the items, to signify that one
involves "having objectively more" than the other, for instance, that acquiring the car is more
than acquiring nothing, and getting both is more than getting the boat alone.  Other pairs of
outcomes are not pre-ranked, e.g., the car alone versus the boat alone.  This ranking isnecessary to determine which gamble to associate with risk aversion, and just as the standard
definition attributes risk aversion to someone with respect to a certain interval scale, and the
relative one compared parties with respect to a certain pairwise matching of outcomes, this one
holds with respect to this ordering.  The definition can easily be extended to several levels on a
dimension, which here might mean different kind of cars and boats, or to more than two
dimensions.
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A dimensional structure is common in foreign policy decisions -- national security is put
as a question of guns or butter, and an alliance decision trades off support in one’s own
conflicts against entanglement in the wars of others.  A state under a deterrence threat
compares the benefits of pursuing its course against the punishment suffered in reaction.
Farnham describes the Munich crisis as dilemma for Roosevelt between preserving the peace as
an international goal and dealing with attitudes of isolationism domestically.  Such situations
are amenable to this concept of risk aversion.
Assuming that the individual is maximizing the expectation of u, this definition of risk
aversion is equivalent to the following condition on the chooser's utilities:
 ½ u(nothing) + ½ u(car boat)< ½ u(car) + ½ u(boat)
         or simply, u(nothing) + u(car boat) < u(car) + u(boat),
where x y means objects x and y being acquired jointly.  To test for risk aversion, then, one has
to know the party's utility function.  This seems more restrictive than before where researchers
attributed risk attitudes by observing choices, but one point of this paper has been that this was
a chimera.  Also, if the model put forward is well-specified, the revised definition can be
applied within it.  Morgan and Palmer (1997, 1998a,b), for example, have developed a "two-
good" theory of foreign policy decisions, the goals being "preservaction" and "proaction,"
defined respectively as maintaining one's security and promoting one's other goals.  The 1998b
paper gives the decision maker an explicit utility function: for two goods in positive amounts
Q1 and Q2, it is a product of powers: u(Q1, Q2) = Q1
a Q2
b,  where a and b are positive.  The
present definition of absolute risk aversion looks at a lower and higher level on each
dimension, corresponding to not having or having the car or boat, so to apply it here one
chooses levels Q1 < Q1' and Q2 < Q2',  and compares u(Q1, Q2) + u(Q1', Q2') with
                                                        
15 A general form still would be a lattice, where higher up indicates additional goods in some objective sense.
As the standard notion of risk aversion requires concavity, this one requires submodularity: u(x) + u(y)   u(x y)
+ u(x y), where x y and x y are the greatest lower and least upper bounds, respectively, of lattice elements x and
y (Birkhoff, 1967).u(Q1’, Q 2) + u(Q1, Q2’).  If the latter is greater, the chooser is risk-averse.  Substituting the









fact, the reverse inequality holds for all allowed values of the quantities and exponents, so the
assumed utility function implies universal risk-acceptance.
16  Since the definition uses only the
ordinal properties of the scales for the Q’s, this conclusion holds for any way of measuring
them that is a monotonic with the original.  The implication that decision makers are always
risk-acceptant goes against the available experimental evidence, as will be discussed, that they
tend to be risk-averse for gains and risk-acceptant for losses.
17
This definition and the standard one are of the absolute variety, and they have another
common feature: they portray a risk-seeker as someone who goes for all or nothing.  To see
this, suppose that an individual might gain a Canadian dollar or a German mark or both, and
thinks of these prospects as lying on separate dimensions, i.e., the person does not make the
decision by translating one currency into an equivalent amount of the other and adding them
together.  Risk aversion in the present sense requires:
u($1CDN) + u(1DM) > u(nothing) + u($1CDN 1DM).
If it is assumed that the currencies are worth the same, and that the person comes to treat them
as one entity, then decision is one-dimensional, and this requirement becomes:
2 u(1 unit) > u(nothing) + u(2 units).
Dividing by 2 reveals that this condition is the standard economic one where a risk-averse
person chooses one unit for certain over an even chance at two units.  In general, when both
dimensions of the items possess interval scales and these are the same scale, the definitions
coincide.  The two definitions have a common element: in a risk-seeker's utility function for
money, one dollar bill is synergistic with another, and the same is true for the utility function
                                                        
16 This can be shown by representing Q1’
a as Q1’
a + k1 and Q2’
b as Q2
b + k2, with positive k1, k2, and expanding
each side.  The condition for risk aversion when there is an interval scale on the quantities is  
2u(Q1, Q2)/ Q1
Q2    0 (Richard, 1975).  Applying this test here gives the derivative as abQ1
a-1Q2
b-1, which is always positive,
implying that the parties are risk-acceptant.
17 An alternative is the utility function 1 - exp(-aQ1 - bQ2).  Applying the derivative test of footnote 16, gives -
ab exp(-aQ1 - bQ2) which is negative, implying risk aversion in the commodity-free sense.for the car and boat.  The important difference is that this definition of absolute risk aversion
needs no interval scale, and has nothing to do with convexity or concavity.
18
Luce’s Associative Model of Joint Receipts
In line with the principle cited earlier, the definition should correspond to some empirical
regularity.  A body of evidence has emerged under the name of "joint receipt" (Thaler, 1985;
Luce, 1997; see also Luce, 1995, 1996; Cho, Luce and von Winterfeldt, 1994; Cho and Luce,
1995; Luce and Fishburn, 1991, 1995; Fishburn and Luce, 1995).  This literature tries to derive
a theory of how people evaluate items in combination and to find a scale for the items.  As a
student, would I rather get 2 B’s, or an A and a C?  Do I put my passport and wallet in the
same pocket?  Would I prefer to have two pieces of bad news on the same day or on different
days?  How about good news?  Questions like these elicit predictable answers -- people want
to hear pieces of bad news at once and keep good news separated.  When the news is mixed
but mostly bad, they want to separate the parts and keep the good news as a "silver lining."
19
Much of the joint receipt experiments involve money and much of the theory makes
essential use of its ratio scale.  This does not help our purpose, but Luce and Fishburn have
developed a version that is free of strong scales on the object of choice (Luce and Fishburn,
1991; Fishburn and Luce, 1995; Luce, 1997).  For two items both preferred to the status quo,
the following rule is suggested by some reasonable normative arguments and is also consistent
with experimental evidence.  A decision maker’s preferences among joint receipts are
represented by a function u satisfying:
u(x y) = u(x) + u(y) - u(x) u(y)/C.
                                                        
18 The definition is not connected with concavity, either in one or two dimensions, since if both dimensions had
interval scales, one transform them with arbitrary monotonically increasing functions f(x) and g(y).  This could
change concavity of the utility function but not its risk aversion properties by this definition, which is
independent of an underlying scale.
19 Joint receipt is meant to define a utility scale as an alternative method to von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
constructing gambles.  It is an approach that has generated scepticism from some theorists on the grounds that
preferences will depend on the particular commodities considered.  Suppose we asked subjects about left shoes
and right shoes.  We would expect everyone to be "risk-acceptant," when clearly their choices are determined
by the context.  The solution is to use reasonable discretion in choosing the context, as one would in applying
any theory.  For example, the regularities around adding weights on each side of a pan balance would disappear
if one used objects that melted or evaporated.  The model is not meant to apply to goods without an obvious
physical complementarity.Here x and y are not numbers but received items, like going on a trip or meeting a friend.  The
rule relates the utility for receiving two items jointly to the utilities of each singly.  It is
assumed that C is a positive constant, and u(e) = 0, where e is defined as the situation where
neither item is acquired.  The values of u in the formula will be positive since the items are
preferred to e, and it will be bounded above by C.  The combination of two items can be
thought of as item in itself, and the model is called "associative" because it satisfies u(x (y z)) =
u((x y) z).  This means that in a system of three items, if two are combined into one, and this is
subsequently combined with the third, then the order of the grouping does not matter.
For the joint receipt of two undesirable items, the u-values will be negative and follow
another rule with another positive constant K:
u(x y) = u(x) + u(y) + u(x) u(y)/K.
This associative model can be combined with the present definition of absolute risk
aversion.  However, this requires some care.  The condition for risk aversion involves the
preference ordering for two 50/50 lotteries, and to predict the decision maker’s choice, one
might be tempted simply to sum the utility values weighted by .50.  The difficulty is that the
associative model as presented gives no grounds for doing this.  Luce’s decision-makers
maximize utilities, but not necessarily expected utilities.  However, the argument will go
through, if made less directly.  Suitable further axioms lead to a representation of the decision
maker's choices by utilities multiplied by probability weights, which are functions of the given
probabilities but may also depend on the preference rank of the associated outcome among the
possible outcomes for a course of action, or they may depend on the reference point.  The
definition's test for risk aversion uses binary gambles with symmetrical probabilities, so the
probability weights will be equal, and the definition's criterion for risk aversion will be:
u(x) + u(y) > u(e) + u(x y)
Substituting u(e) = 0 and Luce's formula for u(x y) in the positive case, gives
u(x) + u(y) > u(x) + u(y) - u(x)u(y)/C.Since C and the u terms are positive, this condition is always satisfied.  The reverse inequality
holds for negative items, so in all, people can be described as risk-averse for gains and risk-
seeking for losses.  The form of prospect theory’s conclusion is reproduced.  One can check
this prediction empirically by the kind of experiments familiar in prospect theory, where a
reversal of preference is induced by manipulating the status quo point from getting nothing to
car boat, and asking people how they would choose among prospects of the items being taken
away.
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The model can generate predictions about when decisions will be faced, if there is a
choice about timing.  Individuals will prefer to receive gains at separate times, assuming the
benefits from combining or separating them in time are respectively u(x y) and u(x) + u(y),
since the latter is greater.  The extension of the model to the joint receipt of a positive and
negative good suggests that decision makers will separate a small gain from a larger loss (keep
a silver lining), and combine a small loss with a larger gain.  Thus, if a set of unpleasant or
dangerous tasks has to be done now or later, a leader will tend to undertake them together.  If
bad news arrives, and there is a further distasteful decision that has to be faced sooner or later,
there will be a tendency to take on the second one and get it over with.
Compared to the first revised definition, then, this one is closely connected to prospect
theory.  It fits well in Luce’s model, which includes many prospect theory elements:
dependence on a reference point, different risk attitudes for losses and gains, and possibly loss
aversion.  It raises an issue that is important in leaders’ decision making but is not usually seen
as connected to risk attitude: the timing of decisions that are seen as inevitable.
6    The Metaphor of Risk as a Substance
These definitions clarify the nature of risk.  They eliminate the ephemeral element of the
interval scale, and show it in its essence.  The economics theory moves partway in this
                                                        
20 For outcomes mixing gains and losses the rules are
u(x y) = [Ku(x) + Cu(y)]/[K + u(y)] when x, x y   e   y, and
u(x y) = [Ku(x) + Cu(y)]/[C - u(x)] when x   e   x y, y.
(Here "x   y" is interpreted as the decision maker preferring or being indifferent to x over y.) These rules are
more complex, but are necessary to preserve associativity.  Prospect theory’s notion of loss aversion can be
interpreted in Luce's model: suppose that x is the event of gaining a specified good and x’ is the event of having
it taken away.  Since x x’ = e, then u(x x’) = 0, and either formula above gives Ku(x) + Cu(x’) = 0, or u(x’) = -
K/C u(x).  Loss aversion thus means K > C.direction by making risk aversion an abstract property of the utility function.  A person on the
street might connect risky behaviour with physical danger -- bungee jumping or driving too fast
-- but the economics definition regards these as surface aspects, and makes it a matter of one’s
utilities, whatever they may be for.  To look at risk in a still purer form, these definitions
eliminate the interval-scale commodity.
Risk attitude has become associated with a certain metaphor, in the sense that our way
of talking and thinking about it tends to map it into a more familiar domain (Lakoff, 1987).
The metaphor around risk treats it as an external substance that has a quantity and is divisible.
Risk is “shared” or “transferred.”  We “bear” it or “manage” it.  We are “attracted” to it or
“avoid” it, as we might be to heavy metal music or anchovies on our pizza.  Like anchovies, we
talk of "taste" for risk.  It is common for a substance
metaphor to arise around an abstract pattern of behaviour, as when nations "acquire" prestige,
people "contain" their anger, or "share" their love.  
Risk-as-a-substance is a handy way of thinking, but it can be misleading.  It promotes
the thought pattern that this paper is arguing against.  In the metaphorical way of thinking, risk
is an autonomous entity that one can like or dislike.  A course of action brings one risk and
possibly the goal as well, as if these were two commodities.  The metaphor conceals the fact
that the decision is entirely in pursuit of the goal, and risk behaviour depends on how one
measures that objective and its interaction with uncertainty.  The present argument can be seen
as involving a reductio ad absurdum of the metaphor.  The investment example described
earlier showed that someone could be risk-averse or risk-seeking depending on the scale used
for the goal.  Mapping this example into the metaphor suggests that I might prefer anchovies
when the pizza is measured by diameter, but dislike them when it is measured by area.  The
fact that this makes no sense shows that the risk-as-a-substance metaphor does not really fit.
These alternative definitions give ways to think about the subject without these misleading
consequences.
7     Conclusions
Some international relations theory is aimed at specific policy questions, such as how to
implement deterrence or whether larger powers should intervene in ethnic conflicts.  Studies of
risk aversion have had a different purpose, to develop a basic understanding of decision
making, in hopes that insights from theory and laboratory experiments can be transferred up to
states.  The great interest in prospect theory comes from the hope that now the discipline hasan account of decision making with empirically validity.  The work has been useful,
strengthening the connection of international relations with psychology, and introducing the
order of a coherent theory.  The subsequent frustration expressed by many writers may come
from the fact that some of its aspects suit economics but not international relations.  This paper
tries to delineate just which parts can be imported and to argue for dropping the rest.  The
empirical research on joint receipts is small as yet and the theory tends to be mathematical and
inaccessible, but the approach seems more promising, as it is less bound by inappropriate
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